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Although achieving in situ conservation is possible without changing farmers’ customary 
management of crops as common pool resources, an alternative approach is to negotiate a 
bioprospecting contract with providers of the resource that involves direct payment and royalties. 
This bioprospecting mechanism implies a change in the customary treatment of crop genetic 
resources as common pool goods and is in line with national ownership mandated by the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). This paper questions the value of bioprospecting for 
protecting traditional agricultural knowledge and argues for a common pool approach. It 
examines the nature of crop genetic resources and farmers’ knowledge about them, and it 
analyzes the nature of the ‘common heritage’ regime that was partly dismantled by the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. The paper reviews the implementation of access and benefit 
sharing schemes under the CBD and discusses programs to recognize Farmers’ Rights that have 
arisen since the establishment of the CBD. It concludes with recommendations for meeting the 
Farmers’ Rights mandate of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Crop genetic resources are the result of collective action over many generations of crops 
and farming people: shared knowledge, seed exchange, and the accumulation of valuable traits in 
crop populations.  The collective action that has generated this knowledge and resource is 
informal, decentralized, permeable, and protean, and the resulting resources have conventionally 
been treated as common pool resources that are freely exchanged and not monopolized by any 
one person or group. Approaches to conserving genetic resources and farmer participation in 
continued crop evolution include increasing the demand for traditional crops by farmers and 
consumers (Smith et al. 2001), enhancing the seed supply of those crops (Bellon 2001), and 
mechanisms to negotiate a monetary value for genetic resources (Ferraro and Kiss 2002).  While 
achieving in situ conservation is possible without changing farmers’ collective action practices, 
an alternative approach is to negotiate a contract with providers of the resource that involves 
direct payment and royalties (Reid et al. 1993). This bioprospecting mechanism implies a change 
in the customary treatment of crop genetic resources as common pool goods and a shift toward 
establishing property for biological resources and traditional knowledge. The issues addressed 
here are the (1) efficacy of replacing collective action without local property with private 
ownership and (2) the conception of conservation mechanisms that retain a collective action 
framework for crop genetic resources.  
                                                 
1 Paper prepared for the CAPRi/IPGRI International Workshop on Property Right, Collective Action and Local 
Conservation of Genetic Resources, Rome September 29 - October 2
 , 2003 
2 Portions of this paper were originally presented at Conference on Biodiversity, Biotechnology, and the Protection 
of Traditional Knowledge, Washington University, St. Louis MO, April 4-5, 2003. 
3 Department of Human and Community Development, University of California, Davis CA 95616. 




2.  THE COMMON HERITAGE REGIME 
Until the end of the last century, crop genetic resources were managed as public domain 
goods according to a set of practices loosely labeled as “common heritage.” Common heritage 
refers to the treatment of genetic resources as belonging to the public domain and not owned or 
otherwise monopolized by a single group or interest. An obstacle to understanding and 
appreciating common heritage is its inherently implicit nature, but roots of the concept are 
visible in the free exchange of seed among farmers, the long history of diffusion through 
informal and formal mechanisms, established scientific practices, and the application of the term 
to other resources in the international arena (e.g., Cunningham 1981). The robust debate about 
common property (e.g., Kennedy and Michelman 1980) was likely to have triggered the use of 
the term by crop scientists. Reference to crop genetic resources as a common heritage appeared 
in the 1980s in association with the establishment of the Commission of Plant Genetic Resources 
at the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (hereafter FAO Commission) 
and the launching of the International Undertaking of Plant Genetic Resources (Pistorius 1997).  
Common heritage for plant resources implies open access and non-exclusion to seeds and 
plants from farmers’ fields. Seeds were collected in different ways by consular officers, travelers, 
missionaries, students, scientists and since the early 20
th century by official collecting missions. 
The latter worked with host government permission and often in collaboration with local 
scientists, and collections were almost always done with consent of farmers and recognition of  
the importance of farmers’ need for seed and undisturbed fields. Two aspect distinguish 
collective action for crop resources from other common property regimes described by 
anthropologists and other social scientists (McCay and Acheson 1987, Ostrom et al. 1994). First 




wood lots or to community managed irrigation systems. These characteristics lend themselves to 
looser and less explicit rules about access to and management of collective resources. Second, 
crop genetic resources are less encumbered by membership rules than other common property 
assets which are often “club goods” (Cornes and Sandler 1996) that are openly accessible only to 
members. Thus, in contrast to groups which are often portrayed in analyses of collective action 
(e.g., Ostrom et al. 1994), crop genetic resources are the product of de facto or quasi-groups, 
loose assemblages of actors who may or may not perceive themselves as a group. This lack of 
structure is logically related to the nature of crop resources and their evolution, but it confounds 
efforts to promote collective action by providing incentives to specific groups of farmers.  
The logical foundation of common heritage is in the nature of crop genetic resources, the 
universal processes of diffusion and dispersal, and the historical practices of reciprocity. Crop 
genetic resources derive originally from the natural and amorphous processes or crop evolution: 
mutation, natural selection, exchange, and decentralized selection. Because no person or group 
controls crop evolution, it is inappropriate for anyone to claim authorship or ownership. 
Likewise, the tangled history of diffusion and dispersal not only obscure origin, but suggests that 
all farmers benefit from fluid movement of seed. Farmers who openly provide seed expect to 
receive it in the same manner, and the same is true for crop breeders.  
Neither common property nor common heritage imply a lack of rules governing the use 
and management of common assets (Ostrom et al. 1994, Brush 1996), a fact that has been often 
misunderstood (Hardin 1968, Shiva 1997). One implicit rule in common heritage of crop genetic 
resources is the rule of reciprocity:  those taking seeds are expected to provide similar access to 
crop resources. The flow of seed within farming villages illustrates this reciprocity, but it is also 




collecting and using genetic resources. Reciprocity by plant collectors and breeders is evident in 
three ways. First, plant collectors who gather material that is freely exchanged within farming 
communities continue this free exchange with crop breeders everywhere (Shands and Stoner 
1997). Second, collectors and crop breeders have historically worked under the ethos of public 
sector research in which the free dissemination of improved crops and the availability of genetic 
resources from gene banks represents reciprocity to farmers and countries that provide genetic 
resources. The wide diffusion of modern crop varieties from international breeding programs is 
one indication of the extent of reciprocity under common heritage (Byerlee 1996). Third, plant 
variety protection, the most widely used form of Breeders’ Rights, includes farmers’ and 
research exemptions which allow farmers to replant and researchers to reuse certified seed 
without paying royalties to the certificate holder (Baenziger et al. 1993). The most recent 
international guidelines for plant variety protection (UPOV 1991) define the breeder’s exemption 
as compulsory but make the farmer’s exemption optional. However, even staunchly pro-
intellectual property countries like the U.S. have retained the farmer’s exemption in plant variety 
protection. Illustrating the reciprocity principle in practice, Shands and Stoner (1997), enumerate 
the multiple ways that the U.S. National Germplasm System (NGPS) honors its obligations  in 
the global flow of crop resources. These include donor support to other countries’ and 
international conservation and crop improvement programs, cooperative breeding programs, 
access to USDA collections, repatriation of germplasm, training, and scientific exchange. The 
history of exchange bears out the open accessibility of germplasm from the NPGS (Smale and 
Day-Rubenstein 2002) 
The exchange of seed among farmers and the lack of explicit proprietary rules governing 
specific crop types, traits, or germplasm appear to be common to agriculture before the 20




century, and they remain characteristic of seed management for the large majority of farmers 
around the world. The occasional prohibitions on the export of seed or plant cuttings, such as the 
19
th century embargo by Peru and Bolivia on the export of Chinchona seedlings (Musgrave and 
Musgrave 2000) or Ethiopia’s more recent embargo on coffee (Fowler and Mooney 1990), 
cannot be interpreted as negating the custom of treating genetic resources as public goods. The 
age-old and continuing diffusion of crops through informal and formal mechanisms, without 
restrictions on the use of progeny, also supports the argument that genetic resources have 
historically been defined as part of the public domain.   
The crop scientists who articulated the idea of common heritage for crop resources had 
been acculturated in science as a social system without proprietary relations over its basic 
resources –  theories, algorithms, or methodologies – that Merton (1973) described as the 
“communism of science” in which authorship did not imply exclusive rights. Accordingly, most 
crop scientists who helped establish the international framework for plant genetic resources 
worked in public breeding programs that released their products as public goods. Common 
heritage management of genetic material that is not claimed as intellectual property remains 
conspicuous at two extremes: (1) in farming communities and (2) in the international gene banks. 
The exchange of crop material among farmers within and between communities appears to be 
ubiquitous (Zeven 1999) and perhaps a necessary part of agriculture. Seed exchange is 
necessitated and promoted by many factors. Seeds have finite viability because of the constantly 
changing natural environment, especially pests and pathogens. Seed becomes infested with 
disease organisms, such as viruses. Human tastes are notoriously fickle, especially when 
reflected in markets. Households lose seed in bad years to rot and vermin. Commingling of 




of gifts of seed, wage payment in kind to agricultural labor, through regional trade of 
commodities and seed, and farmer experimentation (Louette 1999, Perales et al. 2003). This 
commingling poses a high barrier to any other form of seed management than common heritage.  
Common heritage is logical within farming communities where land and other natural 
resources are communally owned, seed is exchanged or shared, invention is collective, 
provenance is ambiguous, and natural and artificial selection are intertwined. Because of the 
transaction costs of proprietary management of seed, common heritage arguably is the best way 
to satisfy the frequent necessity to change or acquire seed in non-market economies. However, 
common heritage is also prevalent where ownership of land and other resources are established 
and where markets for land, labor, and commodities exist. Intellectual property for plants was a 
rather recent change (Fowler 1994) that lagged far behind the development of markets for land 
and labor. Plant patenting and other forms of intellectual property in plants has been willingly 
embraced in some countries but resisted in many others (Khor 1996) because of objections to the 
ownership of life forms and naturally occurring elements as well as the fear that plant patenting 
will concentrate ownership of seeds to the detriment of poor farmers. . 
The flow of crop germplasm through international gene banks and crop breeding 
programs is also an open system. Very few countries or farming systems in the world today do 
not rely to some degree on the international system that moves crop germplasm, breeding lines, 
improved varieties, and commercial seed across international borders.  Studies of breeding 
programs show that developing countries, including those within Vavilov Centers (centers of 
crop origins and diversity), are heavily dependent on international flows of germplasm and more 
dependent than developed countries (Smale and Day-Rubenstein 2002). Rejesus et al. (1996) 




breeders’ use of their own landraces and advanced lines accounted for 41.6% of the breeding 
material in their programs compared to 45.6% from international sources. For rice, Evenson and 
Gollin (1997) document the flow of germplasm in Asia and the dependence of Asian countries 
on germplasm obtained from the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). Vavilov center 
countries (e.g., India, Burma, Bangladesh, Nepal, Vietnam) depended on IRRI for between 
65.0% (India) and 98.1% (Vietnam) for the rice material in their breeding programs. This 
compared to 13.6% in U.S. rice breeding. Fowler et al. (2001) estimate that 89.8% of the rice 
distributed samples from IRRI go to developing countries. Like farmers’ exchange seed of 
landraces, the international exchange of crop germplasm is described as an open system (Fowler 
et al. 2001).  
As with common heritage at the farm and village level, a common heritage approach for 
international exchange is sensible because it lowers transaction costs that are inherent in defining 
and defending property over genetic resources (Visser et al. 2000). These costs include 
negotiation costs, pre-distribution tracking costs, and post-distribution tracking costs (Visser et 
al. 2000) as well as the conventional transaction costs, e.g., exclusion, information, and 
communication (Arrow 1969). An example of information costs associated with crop genetic 
resources is how to ascertain the true “source” of collections. Germplasm collecting existed for 
many decades before it was more formally organized in the 1970s with the creation of world 
collections and the International Board for Plant Genetic Resources. The United States received 
germplasm from many sources, including missionaries, diplomats, and plant explorers. The 
original collections that established the U.S. National Seed Storage Laboratory included material 
that had only the country of origin (A. Damania, personal communication). These U.S. 




as the Italian National Gene Bank at Bari and the International Center for Agricultural Research 
in Dry Areas (ICARDA), thus multiplying the material without detailed provenience in gene 
banks around the world (A. Damania, personal communication). A 1984 review of the status and 
use of gene banks by Peeters and Williams reports that passport data was wholly lacking for 65% 
of the samples in the active international network of gene banks. This percentage has probably 
decreased as more systematic collection has added to inventories, but the FAO (1998) reports 
that only 37% of the material in national collections has passport data. Plant explorers often 
cover large territories and reduce collection times by collecting in markets and other central 
places such as schools. Assigning a territorial designation may also be problematic because of 
the frequency of migration and the transitory nature of political boundaries.  Even if collections 
come directly from farmers, the seed may be a recent acquisition from another farmer or village. 
Assuring that source information adheres to collections also incurs cost.  
 
3.  TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURAL KNOWLEDGE 
Interplay between biological variation and selection make crop and natural evolution 
similar to one another, but the two differ by virtue of the role of “conscious” selection by humans 
in crop evolution. Conscious selection implies knowledge systems about the crop and its 
environment, which are subsets of the more general traditional knowledge and indigenous 
knowledge (e.g., Ellen et al. 2000). While “traditional knowledge” and “indigenous knowledge” 
are not synonymous, they share many attributes, such as being unwritten, customary, pragmatic, 
experiential, and holistic. The terms are frequently used in the same context to distinguish the 
knowledge of traditional and indigenous communities from other types of knowledge, such as 




distinction between traditional and indigenous knowledge pertains to the holders rather than the 
knowledge per se. Traditional knowledge is a broader category that includes indigenous 
knowledge as a type of traditional knowledge held by indigenous communities (Mugabe 1999). 
While traditional knowledge has emerged in international discourse on new legal mechanisms 
(Wendland 2002), indigenous knowledge is a term long in use by anthropologists and other 
investigators of non-industrialized societies (Ellen et al. 2000), and because of this history, 
indigenous knowledge enjoys a more elaborated discussion and definition than the more 
inclusive term. While Kongolo (2001, 357) observes that “(t)raditional knowledge is rarely 
defined within the national, regional, and international frameworks,” indigenous knowledge has 
been extensively analyzed by ethnobotanists and others (e.g., Berlin 1992), so it behooves us to 
utilize the analysis of indigenous knowledge to grapple with traditional knowledge.  
Traditional knowledge is associated with folk nomenclatures and taxonomies of plants 
(Berlin 1992) and the environment (Ellen et al. 2000) and in practical domains such as disease 
etiology (Berlin and Berlin 1996), and agricultural practices (Brush 1992). Distinguishing 
between indigenous knowledge and other knowledge systems has proven to be problematic 
(Agrawal 1995), but anthropologists and others have argued that a number of criteria can be used 
to differentiate the two forms. Indigenous knowledge’s characteristics include (1) localness, (2) 
oral transmission, (3) origin in practical experience, (4) emphasis on the empirical rather than 
theoretical, (5) repetitiveness, (6) changeability, (7) being widely shared, (8) fragmentary 
distribution, (9) orientation to practical performance, and (10) holism (Ellen and Harris 2000).  
These same characteristics apply to traditional knowledge.  
The primary development of crops and cropping systems occurred with traditional 




and most of the world’s farmers still rely on traditional knowledge. The current hyperbolic 
growth of agricultural production may rely on formal science, but it is built on foundations 
developed by traditional farmers. While the accomplishments of traditional knowledge are 
unquestioned, its characteristics pose severe obstacles for its valuation and protection by 
indigenous people and outside interests such as conservationists, indigenous rights activists, and 
rural development agencies. Indeed, outside efforts to value, promote, and protect traditional 
knowledge appear inevitably to distort it and its social context (Dove 1996).  
A severe obstacle to valuation and protection is the disarticulation of different types of 
knowledge when that information is local, orally transmitted, practical, and fragmentary in 
distribution. Agricultural knowledge is comprised of numerous substantive domains - soil types, 
pests, pathogens, environmental conditions such as rainfall and temperature patterns, and crop 
genotypes – as well as management domains – irrigation techniques, soil amendments, planting 
patterns, pest control, weed control, and, crop selection to name a few. Brookfield (2001) adds 
organization as a third domain that includes tenure arrangements, resource allocation, and 
dependency on alternative production spheres. These domains are demarcated by distinct 
lexicons and nomenclatures such as crop variety names or terminology for management 
practices. Traditional knowledge is rife with “covert categories” (Berlin 1992) and unlabeled, 
intermediate domains (Brush 1992) that may link substantive and management domains but 
require intensive research to understand.  
The fact that traditional knowledge is orally transmitted and changeable creates problems 
in identifying truly local and autochthonous knowledge (Dove 2000). The fact that traditional 
knowledge is local, empirical, and holistic suggests that indigenous people don’t have to worry 




are orally transmitted, repetitive, widely shared, and fragmentary, name lists cannot be used 
directly to estimate genetic diversity or population structure above the farm level (Quiros et al. 
1990). Capturing the knowledge in a single domain by collecting its nomenclature, such as crop 
variety names, is relatively easy but of limited use. Linking nomenclatures of substantive 
domains to one another and to management domains is complicated by the inherent qualities of 
localness, oral transmission, and fragmented distribution. The best studies showing linkage 
between different domains (e.g., crop diversity and local ecological conditions) are executed in 
single communities or micro-regions (e.g., Bellon and Taylor 1993). Linking multiple domains, 
such as crop type, soils, and plant diseases, or showing how domains are linked across regions is 
daunting and generally not attempted in research on traditional agricultural systems.  
 
4.  CLOSING THE GENETIC COMMONS 
Following the successful initiatives of the 1970s, which organized an international 
framework for conserving and exchanging crop genetic resources, the common heritage 
approach for managing access came under increasing, erosive pressure. Factors that combined to 
threaten the common heritage approach include the increasing value of genetic resources, the 
expansion of Breeders’ Rights in industrial countries, liberal policy formulation for agricultural 
development, North/South political discourse, and the rise of the environmental movement  
These strands converged in the early 1990s to produce the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD). The nearly simultaneous emergence of the CBD and the Global Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT) hinted at the demise of common heritage by stipulating national ownership of 




The potential coup de grâce to the common heritage regime was delivered in the CBD’s 
sovereignty clause that defined genetic resources as belonging to nation states. The initialing of 
the CBD at the 1992 U.N. Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio 
de Janeiro marks a watershed in the management of crop genetic resources. UNCED sought to 
forge a new framework for confronting environmental problems (Roddick 1997). This new 
framework was intended to defuse increasing North/South polarization of the pre-UNCED era 
with a cooperative approach involving unbinding (“soft law”) agreements such as Agenda 21, 
community based forms of action, inclusion of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
voluntary reporting (Posey and Dutfield 1996, Roddick 1997).  UNCED also followed a period 
of heightened awareness of the trans-national nature of environmental problems and somewhat 
fitful attempts to negotiate individual, legally binding conventions, such as the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UN 1983).  
The post-UNCED system for managing crop genetic resources was characterized by (1) 
national ownership of crop resources overlying customary and professional practices inherited 
from the pre-UNCED (common heritage) period and (2) the creation of management tools that 
would be appropriate to the UNCED principles of sovereign ownership and equitable sharing of 
benefits from the use of biological resources. Two contradictory pressures are, however, evident 
in the spirit of UNCED. The emphasis on sovereign ownership suggested a move to regulate 
access to national resources and to develop access and benefit sharing regimes which generally 
emphasized bilateral contracting mechanisms that became know as bioprospecting agreements 
(Reid et al. 1993, ten Kate and Laird 1999). The second pressure in UNCED was to eschew 
legally binding international conventions (Girsberger 1999) in favor of more cooperative, “soft 




different effects in reshaping access to genetic resources depending whether pharmaceutical and 
natural product resources or crop resources are involved. Access to resources for pharmaceutical 
development tended toward regulation by bilateral contracts while access to resources for crop 
development has tended toward open, multilateral mechanisms. Three differences between these 
two genetic resources explain this outcome. First, pharmaceutical resources tend to involve 
relatively discrete traits and perhaps single genes while crop resources involve quantitative traits 
that are controlled by multiple genes. Second, crop resources are dependent on human 
stewardship and have resulted from collective management and selection. Third, pharmaceutical 
resources lacked the international infrastructure of collection, conservation, public breeding, and 
exchange that was developed for crop resources.  The Merck/InBio contract (Reid et al. 1993) 
epitomized bioprospecting contracts for pharmaceutical and natural product development. No 
comparable agreements were negotiated for crop genetic resources. Rather, “soft law” 
mechanisms, such as Material Transfer Agreements (Barton and Siebeck 1994), were developed 
for crop resources.. For instance, the instruments developed by the international gene banks of 
the CGIAR system informs the recipient of germplasm that it is for research and breeding 
purposes only and inveighs him/her to forgo future claims of intellectual property. These 
mechanisms retain common heritage aspects of the pre-UNCED era and avoid moving to more 
rigid contractual agreements that specify benefit flows that are found in bioprospecting 
agreements for pharmaceutical and other natural products (Reid et al.1993, ten Kate and Laird 
1999). As nations weigh mechanisms to manage access to their crop genetic resources, it 
behooves us to examine the experience regulating access to other biological resources through 
contracts.  




5.  IMPLEMENTATION OF ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING MECHANISMS 
The CBD and GATT set off efforts in many nations to organize national systems for 
regulating access to genetic resources and sharing the benefits from their use (ten Kate and Laird 
1999). A group of researchers at the University of California recently completed a study of 
national access and benefit sharing programs among nations around the Pacific Rim (Carrizosa et 
al. 2004). The study combined detailed country studies in 8 nations with a broad survey of 32 
other nations. While many national programs have not yet been implemented, comparison of 
those that have implemented access and benefit sharing programs illustrates the conditions that 
predict whether an agreement will be concluded and put into practice. Comparison of the 
experiences of Colombia, Mexico, and Costa Rica illustrates the range of experience in 
negotiating agreements between providers and users of genetic resources, from lack of 
agreement to success. The incidence of success is limited to a small number of developing 
countries, notably Costa Rica (Cabrera M. 2004) and Samoa (Cox 2001).  
COLOMBIA 
Colombia’s difficulties in negotiating access and benefit sharing agreements are detailed 
in Ferreira Miani (2004).  In 1997, the government of Colombia approved the National 
Biodiversity Policy (NBP). Colombia’s policy includes a National Biodiversity Strategy and 
Action Plan, creation of a Ministry of the Environment, Decision 391 of the Community of 
Andean Nations establishing a Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources, and national 
legislation and executive decrees to implement Decision 391. Decision 391, the “Cartagena 
Agreement of Andean Countries” is the key to Colombia’s regime. It was formulated in 1996 to 
regulate access to genetic resources and their derivative products and to provide for sharing of 




national authority to regulate access but it also recognizes an indirect role for autonomous 
regional authorities. A significant and troublesome aspect of Decision 391 is its distinction 
between genetic and biological resources.  The latter defined as specimens that are not accessed 
to obtain genetic resources, for instance specimens for taxonomic research. Nevertheless the 
regulating authority may decide that any biological resource is potentially also a genetic 
resource. Likewise, Decision 391 is ambiguous whether botanical extracts for industry are to be 
treated as genetic resources. Therefore, collection of any biological material, whether it is for 
pharmaceutical research, natural product extraction, or agriculture, may be included under the 
access regime.  
The permitting process involves negotiating agreements between the owner of the land 
where collection is planned, the relevant conservation program, the owner of the biological 
resource, the state as owner of the resource, and the pertinent national supporting institution. The 
Ministry of Environment, as the national competent authority is given broad powers decide on 
applications for collection, negotiate terms of access and benefit sharing, and protect the rights of 
the providers of the resource and the state, but Decision 391 does not set any specific standards 
for evaluating applications, the level of benefits, or their distribution. Moreover, the Ministry of 
the Environment is directed to coordinate its review and decision with three other ministries, 
other entities related to the environment, and private and public universities.  
Since the Cartagena Agreement in 1996 that established Decision 391, not a single access 
contract has been signed in Colombia. Ferreira Miani (2004) evaluates nine access proposals 
presented to Colombia’s Ministry of the Environment and finds that three were withdrawn, one 
denied, and five are pending with requests for further information. Ferreira Miani (2004) sites 




confusion and lack of information over the terms of agreement, excessive economic 
expectations, and lack of interest by applicants to become involved in the complicated, expensive 
and uncertain procedure.  
MEXICO 
The Mexican experience in implementing their access and benefit sharing regime is 
analyzed by Larson-Guerra et al. (2004). Mexico represents a case of partial success in achieving 
access and benefit sharing agreements. These agreements have been reached, but a lack of 
subsequent fruition is common. Unlike Colombia, Mexico is not bound by an international 
framework that determines its access and benefit sharing regime. Moreover, the Mexican 
approach is to rely on ecological and wildlife legislation and intellectual property legislation to 
achieve the goals of the CBD. Collection under this framework requires prior informed consent 
by the landowner with the implication of benefit sharing, but access permits are not centralized 
into a single ministry or other government agency.  
A number of bioprospecting projects have been negotiated and initiated in Mexico, and 
Larson-Guerra et al. (2004) examine three projects in depth. The UNAM-Diversa project 
involved collaboration between the National Autonomous University and a U.S. pharmaceutical 
company to prospect on federal public land. This agreement was brokered and facilitated by 
several government agencies including the Secretariat of Environment and National Resources 
(SEMARNAT) and the National Commission for the Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity. The 
UZACHI-Sandoz agreement established collaboration between a consortium of six Zapotec and 
Chinantec communities in the state of Oaxaca in southern Mexico and the Swiss pharmaceutical 
company to evaluate soil microorganisms. Benefit sharing involved short-term benefits, 




Maya International Cooperative Biodiversity Group (Maya ICBG) that brought together a U.S. 
university, a national university in Chiapas Mexico (ECOSUR), a small biotechnology company 
in the U.K., and indigenous communities in the southern state of Chiapas. This agreement was 
financed by a U.S. government program administered through its National Institutes of Health.  
While the Mexican experience shows success in negotiating access and benefit sharing 
agreements, the execution of these projects has been troublesome in all three cases and 
impossible in two out of three. The UNAM-Diversa and the Maya ICBG both ended without 
either providing access or sharing benefits, and activities under the UZACHI-Sandoz agreement 
are suspended and pending the development of a specific legal framework of genetic resources. 
The UNAM-Diversa program was stalled by a public denunciation to the Federal Attorney for 
the Protection of the Environment (PROFEPA), an independent agency that was not involved in 
negotiating the agreement. Although PROFEPA eventually decided that it did not have authority 
to void the agreement, the agreement had expired. The Maya ICBG project also came under 
public attack, including criticism from and the international NGO ETC (previously RAFI) and 
Maya communities that were not part of the project. Despite attempts by SEMARNAT to resolve 
a heated conflict in Chiapas, the project terminated when the local Mexican institution, 
ECOSUR, withdrew.  
The UZACHI-Sandoz agreement remains as the only bioprospecting project of the three 
with possible fulfillment. Nevertheless, this agreement was criticized for possible imbalance in 
providing benefits to the different indigenous communities and for excluding indigenous 
communities. The project is stalled by the lack of long-term contracts, a lack that is in turn 





Costa Rica and the U.S. are the only countries among those studied by Carrizosa et al. 
(2004) that have both negotiated and fully implemented bioprospecting agreements. Costa Rica’s 
experiment with bioprospecting is well known and documented (Reid et al. 1993). Costa Rica  
initiated bioprosecting before the CBD and before a legal framework governing biodiversity (the 
1998 Law of Biodiversity No. 7788). The initial agreement that triggered subsequent ones is the 
Merck-INBio agreement reached in 1991 (Reid et al. 1993).  
INBio grew out of Costa Rica’s unique environmental, social, scientific, and political 
context, but scientific leadership in Costa Rica and networks outside of the country also were 
instrumental in developing this model bioprospecting framework. INBio was established in 1989 
with the support of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy, and Mines (MIRENEM) as part 
of Costa Rica’s efforts to improve environmental protection for its notable biological diversity 
(Gámez et al. 1993). It was created as a private, not-for-profit, public interest association 
dedicated to carrying out research and conservation activities for the protection of biological 
diversity in Costa Rica. A key element in INBio’s approach was the opportunity under the 
regulatory framework of the 1992 Law No. 7317 for Wildlife Conservation (LWC) that 
permitted the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE) to allocate biodiversity prospecting 
concessions in national conservation areas (Gámez et al. 1993).  
The INBio contract with Merck provided access to genetic resources in national parks in 
return for financial support for INBio’s national biodiversity inventory and the National Parks 
Fund of MINAE (Sittenfeld and Gámez 1993). In addition to the Merck agreement, which was 
renewed three times before expiring in 1999, INBio negotiated 12 agreements with international 
research institutions and private firms for prospecting activities that include chemicals from 




bioassays of plants (Cabrera M. 2004). Eight of these agreements are with private firms, one is 
with a multilateral organization, and three are with universities in the United Kingdom, USA, 
and Canada (Cabrera M. 2004).  
The success in implementing bioprospecting projects in this framework owes to the 
special position of INBio as a non-governmental institution with high scientific and 
administrative capacity and the agreement by MINAE to allow INBio to broker contracts for 
access to resources on certain public lands. By working in designated conservation areas, such as 
the Guanacaste National Park, INBio is alleviated from the need to negotiate with landholders 
and local communities. This condition sets the INBio case apart from other bioprospecting 
programs where community participation is an objective. Likewise, the sharing of benefits was 
facilitated by INBio’s scientific and educational role and by its special relation to the National 
Park system and MINAE. These factors help INBio and its international partners to minimize 
transaction costs in negotiating for access and distribution of benefits. By acting as a singular and 
nongovernmental authority in negotiating access and benefits, INBio reduced the complexity of 
negotiating with private firms and universities. Finally, its focus on national parks and 
designated conservation areas directly connected benefits to accepted conservation activities.  
However, and despite the apparent success of this model, Costa Rica has now moved 
beyond the framework of the LWC by enacting the Law of Biodiversity in 1998 (Cabrera M. 
2004). The new law is in part a response to the mandate of the CBD to incorporate access and 
benefit sharing principles into national legislation. The new law replaces the non-governmental 
approach utilized by INBio with a centralized process of issuing access permits through the 
Comisión Nacional para la Gestión de la Biodiversidad (NGB – National Commission for the 




INBio’s record suggests that agreement and implementation is best achieved in a 
decentralized system with flexible norms of negotiating benefits, a direct system whereby the 
entity empowered to grant access negotiates directly with the organization seeking access, and 
where the number of parties in the negotiation and permitting process is minimized. The process 
envisioned in the Law of Biodiversity appears to move Costa Rica away from these norms. 
Although the implementation of the new law is not yet fully developed or tested, it faces 
potential obstacles (Cabrera M. 2004). These include uncertainty about the role of key elements 
in the new access and benefit sharing provisions, ambiguity about the earlier framework 
established under the LWC, and complexity in the application procedures. The general 
atmosphere of negotiating access and benefits under the Law of Biodiversity is to be more 
restrictive and controlling. Furthermore, the constitutional challenge requested by MINAE in 
1998 has raised political uncertainty about the role of the NGB. The brief record of receiving 
applications under the new law appears to validate these concerns since none of the three 
applications submitted to date have been finalized (Cabrera M. 2004). 
Two factors distinguish the successful INBio agreements in Costa Rica from the failed or 
less than successful efforts in Colombia and Mexico. First, the land and resources covered in the 
INBio agreements are owned by the Government of Costa Rica and do not directly involve 
management or participation by other persons or communities. Thus, a single entity, INBio with 
MINAE’s permission, could negotiate the access and benefit sharing agreement. While 
Colombia designates the Ministry of the Environment as the competent national authority to 
review access and benefit sharing proposals, these proposals involve numerous parties – local 
communities, regional authorities, universities, and other government agencies. In two of the 




parties and were challenged by outside communities. In the UNAM-Diversa case, it was not 
clear where authority rested to make a final judgment on the legality of the agreement. Second, 
the decentralized approach that characterized the establishment of INBio agreements helped 
create an atmosphere where an access and benefit sharing agreement could be negotiated and 
implemented, while the legal framework now in place in Costa Rica may retard similar 
negotiations. Colombia’s approach to centralize review of bioprospecting agreements in 
accordance with Decision 391 of the Andean Pact seems to have established the conditions to 
frustrate the successful negotiation of agreements. The process is both complex and encumbered 
by many different interests vying in the same arena.  Mexico’s ambiguity whether a single 
authority has the right to oversee and decide on the legality of bioprospecting agreements was a 
factor in the failure of the UNAM-Diversa and the Maya ICBG projects.  
The experience of access and benefit sharing agreements in Colombia, Mexico, and Costa 
Rica has concerned resources for pharmaceutical and natural product development, but it has 
important implications for policy regarding crop resources and traditional agricultural 
knowledge.  While crop resources differ in critical aspects from pharmaceutical and natural 
product resources, these are often linked into a common category of biological resources that are 
found in less developed countries, managed by traditional communities, and collected and used 
by scientific organizations from industrial nations. The CBD, for instance, does not distinguish 
the resources of domesticated species as belonging to a category that is different from other 
biological resources. Nevertheless, important differences separate crop resources from the other 
types for designing appropriate access and benefit sharing regimes. Three important qualities set 
the genetic resources of agriculture apart from those of pharmaceuticals and natural products: (1) 




resources, (2) genetic complexity of crop traits, and (3) a long history of exchange and publicly 
supported conservation of crop genes within and outside of their places of origin. These qualities 
of crop resources increase the number of persons who have legitimate roles in access to and 
benefit sharing from crop resources.  Following an ad hoc approach to formulating agreements 
between individuals or individual communities and firms that use agricultural resources will lead 
to challenges because it appears arbitrary in the face of the circulation of crop genetic resources 
among individuals and communities. The experience of attempting to meet the CBD goal of 
negotiated access and benefit sharing agreements suggests that we approach crop resources in a 
fundamentally different way. The logical approach for crop resources is to revisit the ex ante 
common heritage regime, albeit in the international framework of the CBD. As discussed below, 
the culmination of nearly two decades of negotiations over an international framework for 
exchange and use of crop genetic resources indicates that common heritage has, indeed, re-
emerged as a principle for managing these resources.  
 
6.  THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY FOR PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES FOR 
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 
After long negotiations under the auspies of the FAO’s International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) was completed (FAO 2001) and has now been 
signed by 79 countries, including the U.S. (FAO 2003). The ITPGRFA takes a multilateral 
approach that reaffirms a common heritage approach for the crop genera that are included in list 
of crops covered by the pact. This treaty was negotiated by parties to the CBD and with the 
endorsement of the CBD. States retain sovereign rights over their genetic resources, including 




national laws that stipulate criteria such as novelty, non-obviousness, utility, stability, and 
uniformity. The treaty implies that genetic resources in gene banks do not meet these criteria. 
The core provisions of the ITPGRFA (Articles 10-12) place the resources of 36 genera of crops 
and 29 genera of forages in the public domain and guarantee access to these resources for 
breeding and research. Germplasm from the multilateral system will be available with a Material 
Transfer Agreement (MTA) that may include provisions for benefit sharing in the event of 
commercialization. Implicit in this multilateral approach and reminiscent of common heritage is 
the idea that open accessibility of crop resources has the potential to return benefits, such as 
improved crop varieties and scientific collaboration, that are more widely distributed and 
valuable than financial rewards of a contractual, bilateral approach.  
Article 13 of the ITPGRFA lays out a financial procedure for benefit sharing by 
stipulating that commercialization of a new plant variety will trigger a financial contribution to 
the multilateral system. Again, the approach is multilateral rather than contractual between the 
genetic resource provider and the person who commercialized a product using that resource. This 
approach reflects the intention of the ITPGRFA to eschew individual or community based 
property for crop genetic resources or traditional knowledge. The level, form, and conditions of 
payment (for instance whether small farmers are exempt) is not resolved in the treaty and will be 
subject to further negotiations within the Governing Body of the International Undertaking. The 
benefit sharing mechanism of the ITPGRFA faces serious logistical difficulty because of the 
long lag time between access to genetic resources and commercialization. Moreover, identifying 
the contribution of a specific resource within the complex pedigree of an improved crop variety 
poses a major obstacle to negotiating benefit sharing. Nevertheless, the treaty provides a 




While the CBD sovereignty clause invited the rise of bilateral agreements, five factors 
pushed ITPGRFA toward a multilateral framework. First, replacing the open system with one 
defined by bilateral contracts would entail steep transaction costs that might exceed the value of 
the resources. Second, the process of creating a new access regime based on bilateral contracts 
posed the threat of interrupting germplasm exchange because of an anti-commons (Heller and 
Eisenberg 1998) resulting from the claims of different parties to control access (Correa 2000). 
Third, increasing evidence suggested heavy dependence by poor countries on outside germplasm 
resources (Fowler et al. 2001), contradicting the earlier conclusion (Kloppenburg and Kleinman 
1987) that industrial countries were more dependent on germplasm than developing countries.  
Fourth, accessions from large and valuable collections of the CGIAR network and industrial 
countries, such as the National Seed Storage Laboratory of the U.S., remained openly available 
to crop breeders. Finally, non-governmental organizations, such as the Genetic Resources Action 
Network (GRAIN) played an important role in promoting a multilateral approach and in 
informing developing countries of this option (GRAIN 2000) 
Uncertainty over whether a new international order for crop genetic resources should 
reconfirm or eliminate common heritage, as plant breeders understood it, had bogged down 
negotiations about the International Undertaking at the FAO (Fowler and Mooney 1990). The 
ITPGRFA overcame the conflict by shifting emphasis toward open-access to crop resources and 
away from the issue of compensation.  Avoiding the long-term disputes about patenting life 
forms and gene sequences also aided the agreement on the status of international collections, 
although highly contentious issues, such the patentability of individual genes which are accessed 
from the multilateral system but transposed into a different species, are still to be resolved by the 




and accepting the co-existence of Breeders’ Rights and common-pool rights, the ITPGRFA 
avoided any specific national opposition. 
 
7.  FARMERS’ RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL 
AGRICULTURAL KNOWLEDGE 
The FAO’s International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources provided a forum to 
discuss equity interests of farmers in developing nations and gave rise to the movement to create 
a program of Farmers’ Rights. FAO Resolution 8/83, which established the International 
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources in 1983, had stressed the common heritage principle 
that plant genetic resources should be available without restriction and provided a sweeping 
definition of genetic resources as incorporating not only wild and weedy crop relatives and 
farmers’ varieties but also newly developed “varieties” and “special genetic stocks (including 
elite and current breeders’ lines and mutants)” (FAO 1987). Non-governmental organizations 
that presented the idea of Farmers’ Rights to the FAO Commission in 1985 were antagonistic to 
Breeders’ Rights (Mooney 1996) and perhaps believed that international acceptance of Farmers’ 
Rights would undermine individual rights (Fowler 1994).  
The gambit to undermine Breeders’ Rights through a binding international resolution 
endorsing unrestricted access to all genetic material failed because of the opposition of states that 
provide for Breeders’ Rights and the availability of large stocks of genetic resources in open 
collections that are linked to international agricultural development. FAO Resolution 5/89 
resolved that the two types of rights were not incompatible and defined Farmers’ Rights as:  
“...rights arising from the past, present and future contributions of farmers in conserving, 
improving, and making available plant genetic resources, particularly those in centres of 




and future generations of farmers, for the purpose of ensuring full benefits to farmers, and 
supporting the continuation of their contributions...” (FAO 1998, 278) 
Farmers’ Rights differed from Breeders’ Rights in that they were to be vested in the 
“International Community” rather with individuals. However, by not specifying what genetic 
materials were covered or who could claim ownership, the FAO definition created a problematic 
category. Farmers’ Rights have remained an elusive goal. Their early association with the anti-
Breeders’ Rights agenda, and their ambiguities regarding materials and holders of the rights 
thwarted its acceptance as an international principle or program. Following the ITPGRFA 
negotiation, the fate of Farmers’ Rights will be determined at the national level.   
The nature of the rights conferred by Farmers’ Rights hinges on the economic benefit 
provided in the past, but no estimate of value or widely accepted method to estimate value of 
crop genetic resources are available. Estimating the historic contribution of farmers’ varieties 
ideally requires one to separate the economic contribution of germplasm from other factors such 
as the development of physical infrastructure and human capital. Likewise, estimating the cost of 
Farmers’ Rights is hampered by the lack of a program for how the stream of benefits to farmers 
might be used to achieve conservation goals.  
Bipoprospecting contracts potentially offer a mechanism to provide equity and stimulate 
conservation by increasing the value of biological resources, but this mechanism is likely to be 
ineffective for addressing equity and conservation issues relating to crop germplasm. Because 
collecting genetic resources tends to be “single shot” (Barrett and Lybbert 2000), collecting fees 
are unlikely to have a long-term conservation effect. Contracts are likely to arbitrarily favor 
single communities or regions who have no special claim to crop germplasm, and Barrett and 
Lybbert (2000) argue that bioprospecting windfalls may be exclusionary or even regressive. The 




is a liability (Nigh 2002). If conceived as a market situation between community “sellers” and 
seed company “buyers,” Farmers’ Rights exist in a monopsony environment in which a 
multitude of farmers with genetic resources face an extremely limited set of potential “buyers” 
for their resource. Mendelsohn (2000) observes that this situation leads to market failure and 
argues that a monopoly acting on behalf of farmers is necessary. 
Possible titleholders of Farmers’ Rights include farming communities and states (Correa 
2000).  Inter-community exchange and seed flows expose claims by one community for rights to 
a specific crop resource to challenges from other communities. The same may be true at the 
international level where informal seed movement also exists (e.g., Valdivia et al. 1996). 
Transaction costs to settle such disputes may be higher than the value of the right, and arbitrary 
allocation presents ethical problems of favoring one community over others. The possibility of 
international disputes or price competition has led some regions, such as the Andean nations, to 
initiate a consortium approach to providing biological resources (ten Kate and Laird 1999), but 
the number of possible participants and other factors are likely to make the costs of similar 
approach among communities prohibitive. 
The subject matter of Farmers’ Rights is equally ambiguous. Characterization of gene 
bank collections is limited, and much of the material is stored without adequate documentation to 
identify farmers’ who might be considered as the sources (Peeters and Williams 1984). Defining 
knowledge rather than genetic resources as the subject matter of Farmers’ Rights is problematic 
because farmers’ knowledge is local, widely shared, changeable, and orally transmitted.  Lastly, 
the concept does not specify whether wild relatives of crops, which have provided valuable traits 
to crop improvement but are not always known or used by farmers, are covered by Farmers’ 




The final criterion that distinguishes Farmers’ Rights from intellectual property is their 
duration (Correa 2000). The monopoly right of a grant of the intellectual property is made to be 
temporary as a way to balance the goal of increased invention over the goal of open competition. 
The unlimited duration of Farmers’ Rights foregoes this balance, a policy of dubious merit if 
other communities or nations have valuable genetic resources or prove to more effective 
conservationists. The ITPGRFA moves away from a binding international resolution to create 
Farmers’ Rights and assigns the realization of Farmers’ Rights to national governments. The 
treaty inveighs on its Contracting Parties to provide for these rights in three ways: (a) protection 
of traditional knowledge; (b) provide equitable participation in sharing benefits; and (c) the allow 
participation in making decisions related to the conservation and use of plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture. (FAO 2001). As in the ex ante common heritage period, farmers are not 
granted the right to exclude others from using or benefiting from crop resources..  
Negotiating Farmers’ Rights at the national level faces obstacles that were not critical in 
the international arena, such as political weakness of the traditional farming sector, urban and 
consumer demand for low cost commodities, and the need to promote agricultural development. 
Although the CBD does not distinguish crop genes as a special category of biological resource, 
negotiations for Farmers’ Rights will have to acknowledge the regime established by the 
ITPGRFA. Research on crop populations in traditional farming provide three lessons that will 
weigh on Farmers’ Rights negotiations. First, crop genetic resources are collective inventions 
and meta-populations rather than assets that are privately derived and managed. Second, 
developing nations have benefited from adopting new technology, including new crop varieties, 
but landraces still exist in specific agricultural niches. Third, demand for crop genetic resources 




The history of negotiating mechanisms to protect farmers’ knowledge offers four 
guidelines for crafting national Farmers’ Rights programs.  First, the goals of Farmers’ Rights 
are to balance Breeders’ Rights and encourage farmers to continue as stewards and providers of 
crop genetic resources. Second, Farmers’ Rights are held collectively rather than by individual 
farmers or communities. Third, Farmers’ Rights are not exclusive or meant to limit access to 
genetic resources. Finally, mechanisms are needed to share benefits received by the international 
community from genetic material from farmers’ fields or international collections.  
 
8.  FARMERS’ RIGHTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
India’s Act N
o 53, 2001 for The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights  
recognizes Farmers’ Rights in four ways (India 2001).  First, farmers’ roles as keepers of genetic 
resources and sustainers of crop evolution are to be recognized and rewarded through a National 
Gene Fund that will be financed by annual fees levied on breeders of registered varieties in 
proportion to the value of these varieties [Section 39 (1) (iii)]. Benefit sharing to communities 
that provided germplasm used in a registered variety will be determined according to the extent 
and nature of the use of genetic material in the registered variety [Section 26(5)]. Second, India’s 
Act 53 establishes the farmers’ exemption that was present in early plant variety protection 
regimes (Baenziger et al. 1993), allowing farmers are entitled to “save, use, sow, resow, 
exchange, share or sell his farm produce including seed of a variety protected under this Act in 
the same manner as he was entitled before the coming into force of this Act” [Section 39 (1) 
(iv)]. Third, breeders are required to disclose in their application for registration information 
regarding tribal or rural families’ use of genetic material used in the breeding program [Section 




registration. Fourth, any interested party may file a claim on behalf of a village or local 
community stating its contribution to the evolution of a registered variety (Section 26). If this 
claim is substantiated, the breeder is required to pay compensation to the National Gene Fund.   
Although farmers are recognized as potential breeders in the Indian law, they are not 
given unusual privileges in registering varieties.  Section 39 (1) (i) of India’s Act 53 (India 2001) 
allows farmers to register varieties but only insofar as these varieties meet the same criteria 
(novel, distinct, and uniform) as breeders’ varieties [Section 15 (3) (a) – (c)].  However, farmers 
who wish to register a variety are exempt from the need to demonstrate that the genetic or 
parental material was lawfully acquired [Section 18 (1) (h)]. Section 15 (2) also provides for the 
registration of “extant varieties” that meet criteria such as distinctiveness, uniformity, and 
stability that are to be determined by the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights 
Authority. However, extant varieties are to be owned by the State Government [Section 27 (1)], 
making this a means to limit the ability of persons to certify varieties that they have not bred.  
  The Organization of African Unity’s African Model Legislation for the Protection 
of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access to 
Biological Resources (OAU 2000) envisions Farmers’ Rights in four ways. First, farmers can 
certify their varieties as intellectual property without meeting the criteria of distinction, 
uniformity, and stability that breeders must meet. This certificate provides farmers with “the 
exclusive rights to multiply, cultivate, use or sell the variety, or to license its use” (OAU 2000, 
Article 25). Second, farmers are given the right to “obtain an equitable share of benefits arising 
from the use of plant and animal genetic resources” (OAU 2000, Article 26). The African Model 
Law (Article 66) envisions a Community Gene Fund to accomplish benefit sharing and to be 




exemption to Breeders’ Rights restrictions, to “collectively save, use, multiply and process farm-
saved seed of protected varieties” [OAU 2000, Article 26 (1e)]. Fourth, farmers’ varieties are to 
be certified as being derived from “the sustainable use of a biological resource” (OAU 2000 
Article 27). This certificate does not imply financial reward.  
  The ITPGRFA, Indian Act 53, and the African Model Legislation accept the co-
existence of Breeders’ Rights along with Farmers’ Rights and intend to accomplish benefit 
sharing through a centralized funding mechanism linked to Breeders’ Rights. This same benefit 
sharing mechanism is present in the Genetic Resources Recognition Fund (GRRF) of the 
University of California that imposes a licensing fee on the commercialization of patented plant 
material involving germplasm from Developing Countries (ten Kate and Laird 1999). This 
mechanism is a generic tool for reciprocity rather than one to reward specific farmers or 
communities. The African Model Legislation goes furthest in signifying individual communities 
as property holders and beneficiaries, while the Indian Act 123 combines both the generic and 
specific uses of compensation through the centralized gene fund. Farmers’ Rights are also 
provided in farmers’ exemptions to restrictions embedded in Breeders’ Rights. Contradicting the 
view that Farmers’ Rights are not a form of intellectual property (CIPR 2002), the Model African 
Law goes beyond the ITPGRFA and the Indian Act 123 in granting exclusive rights to farmers 
over their varieties.   
Two factors indicate that taxing certified crop varieties will offer meager resources to 
finance Farmers’ Rights. First, plant variety certificates in industrialized countries have relatively 
low or negligible value. Lesser (1994) determined that the price premium associated with 
soybean certified seed was only 2.3 percent in New York State and concluded that this form of 




increasingly dependent on the use of “elite” breeding lines that are several generations removed 
from farmers’ varieties and show increasingly complex pedigrees involving crop genetic 
resources from many sources (Smale et al. 2002). Although India is a net exporter of landraces as 
breeding material, foreign landraces are equally important to India’s rice program as national 
landraces (Gollin 1998). Because African agriculture is heavily dependent on crops originating 
in other regions, dependence on international germplasm is high. For instance, in Nigeria’s rice 
breeding program, 180 out of 195 landrace progenitors used in breeding were borrowed from 
other countries (Gollin 1998). Estimating the contribution of a single landrace or collection to the 
value of a modern variety has not been accomplished and is likely to become more difficult as 
pedigrees become more complex.  
In sum, Farmers’ Rights are a moral but largely rhetorical recognition of the contribution 
of farmers to the world’s stock of genetic resources, and they provide only a limited mechanism 
to share benefits from using crop genetic resources or to promote their conservation.  
 
9.  CONCLUSION 
Numerous parties and participants have struggled with the issue of protecting traditional 
agricultural knowledge and crop resources through binding international resolutions, formal 
contracting, and non-contractual benefit sharing mechanisms. The impetus for this was the 
recognition that resources and knowledge were eroding under the pressures of modernization, 
but it also grew out of the North/South dialog from the mid-20
th century. The move to end 
common heritage as a management scheme for genetic resources is understandable as both a 
liberal ideology to overcome the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968) and an anti-colonialist 




these sources for justifying the closure of the genetic commons are based on inaccurate 
caricatures of traditional resource managers and the international crop germplasm system. They 
overlook successful and long-lived systems of managing common pool resources (Ostrom 1990), 
networks of interdependence among farming communities, and their links to a global flow of 
crop material. Moreover, the North/South dialog understates the value global public goods (Kaul 
et al. 1999) and international cooperation involving both North/South and South/South transfers.  
Arguably, it is time to move beyond both the Tragedy of the Commons and North/South 
dialog as bases for developing mechanisms to protect traditional agricultural knowledge and crop 
resources. This conclusion is embedded in the negotiated settlement of the ITPGRFA that returns 
to common heritage for the world’s most important crops. The weakness of that treaty, however, 
is that it does not give proper emphasis to the obligations of industrial countries and developing 
countries alike to support conservation of crop resources beyond funds raised in connection to 
commercializing improved crop varieties. This mechanism is likely to be inadequate to meeting 
conservation budgets that are already inadequate (NRC 1993).  Rather, benefit sharing must 
come from a more traditional transfer of international capital: development assistance focused on 
programs to improve rural incomes in genetically diverse farming systems. An assortment of 
tools now exist to use those funds in a way that increases production and income without 
replacing traditional crop populations (Brush 1999). Bilateral and multilateral development 
assistance that funds rural development activities and benefits the stewards of the world’s crop 
resources can be justified as part of the reciprocal obligations of industrial nations to developing 
nations. Multilateral efforts such as the Global Environmental Facility’s program on 
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity Important to Agriculture (GEF 2000) 




2002) embody reciprocity through international financial assistance. The irony of this conclusion 
is that it reverts to tools and principles that were established before the assault on common 
heritage. 
Collective action was crucial to the creation of crop genetic resources, and it remains 
critical to maintaining the evolutionary system that generates these resources. However, the 
collective action involved in creating and maintaining crop genetic resources is substantively 
different from that involved in managing fixed assets, such as irrigation systems, pastures, and 
fishing territories, that are associated with common property. The moveable, replicable, and 
protean nature of crop resources led to the common heritage regime, and efforts to support 
collective action are most likely to succeed by working with this regime rather than trying to 
replace it with community property systems based on fixed asset models. Supporting collective 
efforts by farmers to improve their yields and livelihoods is eminently workable without 
imposing new forms of property to replace common heritage. The case studies of access and 
benefit sharing efforts under the CBD indicate that new property based schemes for farmers and 
communities are unworkable and likely to forestall more viable approaches to address the needs 
of conserving genetic resources and improving rural livelihoods. Meeting the challenge to 
establish Farmers’ Rights should follow the lead of the ITPGRFA and India’s Act 53 that 
emphasize multi-community solutions and a move away from individual contracts for accessing 
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